

# **Balkans' Integration Process at the Crossroads**

Rethinking Southeastern Europe through a pan-European perspective

**Christophe Solioz**

Secretary-General of the *Center for European Integration Strategies* (CEIS)

Berlin, 2 July 2007

Paper presented in the session "State Building and Stabilization in South East Europe" at the ICCEES Regional European Congress "Transcending Europe's Borders: The EU and Its Neighbours" organized by the German Association for East European Studies (DGO)

**Check against delivery**

## **Introductory note**

To state the obvious, Europe today — and 'Europe' refers not only to Western Europe, nor exclusively to the European Union — is completely different from what it was some fifteen years ago. So too is Southeastern Europe, though for different reasons. The break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the early 1990s and, most of all, their 'transition through war' (*transition guerrière*)<sup>1</sup> considerably affected the fate of the region.

In their first post-war decade, the European Union (EU) integration process, taken on a country-by-country basis, was the main incentive to reform. Regional initiatives, such as the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, launched in 1999 under the auspices of the OSCE, and the recently reframed Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) have received increased attention as the regional dimension — initially a somehow neglected facet — is now seen as a crucial issue.

Thus, in this first phase, the EU can be said to have garnered the lion's share of attention to the detriment of pan-European organizations, such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe and UN agencies such as the UNECE. This paper argues that, in a new geo-strategic environment, pan-European organizations must complement the EU approach. This contribution will, firstly, review the current situation in Southeastern Europe, secondly, outline a pan-European perspective, and thirdly, briefly focus on the fate of regional initiatives.

---

<sup>1</sup> See Marina Glamocak, *La Transition guerrière yougoslave* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002).

## 1. Southeastern Europe at a glance

### 1.1. Main regional trends:

Southeast Europe is often only a euphemism, a way to avoid the term 'Balkans', which has acquired a negative connotation in the minds of both local residents and the rest of the world. For the purposes of this study, Southeastern Europe includes the following countries in transition from planned to market economy (as a distinguishing criterion): Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and UNMIK/Kosovo. This usage of the term Southeastern Europe became common in the context of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, established in 1999. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe targeted the above-mentioned Southeast European countries, but implicitly referred to an inclusive regional approach. The term 'Western Balkans', however, has acquired popularity again as an euphemism, this time of the countries that once belonged to the former Yugoslavia (minus Slovenia, plus Albania). From a EU perspective, the Western Balkans are divided into candidate countries and potential candidate countries. Beyond the various designations, the regional dimension doesn't disappear, however.

**Table 1: SEE EU Accession Forecast**

	<b>SAA</b>	<b>Negotiations</b>	<b>EU</b>	<b>Euro</b>
Bulgaria	1995	1999	2007	2009
Romania	1995	1999	2007	2012
Croatia	2005	2005	2010	2012
The fYR Macedonia	2005	2008	2012-2013	2015
Albania	2006	2009	by 2015	by 2017
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2007	2009	by 2015	by 2017
Serbia	2007	2009	by 2015	by 2017
Montenegro	2007	2010	by 2015	2002

Source: Gligorov 2007

The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAp) is the EU policy framework for the countries of the region — Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro.<sup>2</sup> At the EU Thessaloniki summit on 21 June 2003 the EU made the promise that the Southeast Europe countries could join the Union provided they bring themselves up to EU standards. Where do we stand four years later? Slovenia — since May 2004 — Bulgaria and Romania — since January 2007 — are fully fledged EU members. But the other countries remain knocking at the door: on the one hand, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey as candidate countries; and, on the other hand, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia as potential candidate countries. Indeed, until the June 2007 EU summit (see below), the Southeast Europe countries' EU prospects in 'post referendum Europe'<sup>3</sup> appeared bleak: between 2005 and 2007, more than the speed and achievements of the reform process oriented on the EU *acquis communautaire* in the various countries of the region, it was the exceedingly long 'pause for reflection', EU's limited 'absorption capacities'<sup>4</sup> and the 'enlargement fatigue' that were blocking the enlargement process. Nevertheless, all countries of the region are supposed to join, sooner or later, the EU (see table 1).

<sup>2</sup> The main elements of this long-term commitment to the region were first presented in a Commission Communication (COM (99) 235 of 26 May 1999). The Central European countries in transition, Bulgaria and Romania completed that process before joining the EU.

<sup>3</sup> See Christophe Solioz, "The Balkans in Post-Referendum Europe," *Turning Points in Post-War Bosnia* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007 [2005]), pp. 144-52.

<sup>4</sup> To clarify this notion recently converted to 'capacity to integrate,' see Siegfried Schultz and Ulrich Brasche, "Absorptionskapazität der Europäischen Union – eine Orientierungshilfe," *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen*, 47(2007) 3, pp. 6-19.

Despite some back-peddalling, the situation of these countries shows — contrary to what is often stated — a far more positive than negative picture overall. This applies in a particular way to the economies of the region: their continued growth can be assessed to be sustainable (average GDP growth rates illustrate this; see table 2) and the business climate has improved. The rapid growth of exports (even if not at the same speed as the GDP), the increased foreign investments and the recovered labour market also illustrate the improved economic environment. Other positive signs are the indicators of macroeconomic stability, low inflation, improved public sector performance and fiscal balance. Only employment tends to recover more slowly. Thus, the economies of Southeast European countries clearly show signs of catching up. Of course, some crucial questions remain unresolved, including the status of Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina's problematic internal integration. Nonetheless, as noted by Vladimir Gligorov: "The stability and growth have proved to be much more resilient to political shocks and instabilities than in the past".<sup>5</sup>

**Table 2: Gross domestic product**

	1995	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006 <sup>1)</sup>	2006 <sup>1)</sup>	2007	2007	2008	Index 1990=100 2006	Index 2000=100 2006
							1st quarter		forecast			
Croatia	6.8	5.6	5.3	4.3	4.3	4.8	6.0	7.0	5	5	113.4	132.4
The FYR Macedonia	-1.1	0.9	2.8	4.1	3.8	3.1	2.2	7.0	4	4	100.6	110.3
Turkey	7.2	7.9	5.8	8.9	7.4	6.1	6.7	.	5.5	6.5	186.1	131.0
<i>Candidate countries</i>	7.0	7.5	5.7	8.3	7.0	5.9	6.5	.	5.4	6.3	174.2	130.5
Albania	8.9	4.3	5.8	6.2	5.6	4.9	.	.	5	5.5	.	139.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	50.0	5.5	3.0	6.0	5.5	6.2	.	.	6	6	.	134.9
Montenegro	.	1.7	2.4	4.2	4.0	6.5	6.8	6.6	5	5	.	119.9
Serbia	.	4.2	2.5	8.4	6.2	5.7	7.0	8.7	5	5	.	136.4
<i>Potential candidate countries</i>	.	4.5	3.1	7.3	5.8	5.8	.	.	5.2	5.3	.	135.7

1) Preliminary.

NB: real change in % against preceding year

Source: wiiw, July 2007

The following reviews a set of countries focusing on the EU integration process, which provide benchmarks for assessing the situation.

## 1.2. Country-by-country review:

*Albania's* impressive reform progress in recent years paved the way for the conclusion of negotiations with the EU, which led to signing a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) on 12 June 2006. The SAA will enter into force following its ratification, which is expected to take about two years. In the meantime, an Interim Agreement allows the country to benefit from the SAA's trade-related conditions. The 1992 Trade, Commercial and Economic Co-operation Agreement and the Interim Agreement will be replaced by the SAA once it enters into force. At the latest EU/Albania Consultative Task Force (CTF) meeting in June 2006 the Commission emphasized to the country's authorities the importance of demonstrating progress in fostering freedom of expression, property restitution and compensation, electoral reform, human rights, and minority rights. The Commission also provided guidance to Albania on implementing Interim Agreement commitments in the area of

<sup>5</sup> In Vladimir Gligorov and Sándor Richter *et al.*, *High Growth Continues, with Risks of Overheating on the Horizon* (Vienna: wiiw, Series: Research Reports, no. 341, July 2007), part B.

competition, public procurement and intellectual commercial and industrial property.

*Bosnia and Herzegovina* is unrecognizable from twelve years ago. The negotiations on a SAA were launched in November 2005. Meanwhile, the technical talks were completed on 14 December 2006 with an agreement on the text of the Agreement. However, as political issues continue to hinder the adoption and implementation of reforms in four areas (on police, broadcasting, progress in functional state-building, and co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia), the signing of the SAA has been postponed for an indefinite period. Consequently, the country remains a potential candidate country for EU accession. National reintegration and consensus about a common future remain two very problematic issues. While the country seems unfortunately not yet ready to take full responsibility for its future — not because there is no consensus on the future of the country, but because it must move step-by-step from the ‘Bonn powers’ to the EU conditionality. In a newly polarized situation, a reframed and effective Office of the High Representative (OHR) must now finish the job and make the country ready to assume its full sovereignty and integration with Europe — as one of its sovereign Member States. Bosnian politicians could be inspired by Slovakia’s successful sprint to catch up with the rest of Central Europe in the post-Meciar years, and welcome Miroslav Lajčák — the new High Representative since 1 July 2007. The country’s future depends on the ability of the various communities to reach compromise and focus on reforms.

*Croatia* made outstanding progress in meeting the conditions for starting accession negotiations on 3 October 2005. For Croatia, this process began in October 2005 and finished in October 2006. The screening encompassed explanation of the whole range of EU legislation, on a chapter-by-chapter basis, and an examination of Croatia’s plans for its adoption and implementation. It will enable the EU to decide upon the opening of individual chapters for negotiations. Notably, in economic terms, the country seems well positioned to become a full member, as soon as the enlargement process starts moving again.<sup>6</sup>

*The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* is still a weak and fragile State, in spite of its remarkable recovery from the turmoil of 2000. Nevertheless, it has made steady progress on its way to joining the EU. In April 2001, the country signed an SAA, which entered into force in April 2004. The country subsequently submitted an application for EU membership on 22 March 2004 and the European Commission — in its Opinion adopted on 9 November 2005 — analysed the country’s application on the basis of its capacity to meet the criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 and the conditions set for the SAp. Based on this assessment, the Commission recommended that the European Council grant the country candidate status as a political recognition of a closer relationship between the EU and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on its way towards membership. As regards the possible opening of accession negotiations, the Commission indicated that negotiations could begin once the country has reached a sufficient degree of compliance with the membership criteria.

*Montenegro* successfully organized a referendum on independence on 21 May 2006, in line with the provisions of Article 60 of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro, in compliance with a recommendation by the EU. Importantly, the secession of Montenegro was peaceful and did not contribute to instability in Serbia. Having achieved independence, the country is moving toward the EU accession. The EU has started to adapt the instruments of the Stabilisation and Association process (SAp) to the new situation. Following the adoption of an SAA mandate for negotiations on 24 July 2006, the European Commission launched SAA negotiations on 26 September 2006. The technical part of SAA negotiations was completed on 1 December 2006. On 15 March 2007, the SAA was initialled by Prime Minister Sturanović and EU Commissioner Olli Rehn. This was a major step forward for the country.

---

<sup>6</sup> Croatia’s EU integration process is well assessed by the four volumes edited by Katarina Ott, *Croatian Accession to the European Union*, Zagreb: IPF and FES, vol. 1, 2003; vol. 2, 2004; vol. 3, 2005; vol. 4, 2006. Srđan Dvornik and Christophe Solioz (eds.), *Next Steps in Croatia’s Transition Process* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007) presents a series of critical essays which complete this overview.

*Serbia* is of course mainly affected by Kosovo's fate. While the Serbian Radical Party was close to coming to power in the general elections held on 21 January 2007, recent developments — among them the establishment of a new reform-minded government on 15 May 2007 — seem to suggest that Belgrade has no desire to return to the isolation of the Milošević years. The new government clearly intends to restart the country's journey towards Europe. The political instability stemming from the still-unresolved Kosovo issue must not divert attention: the Serbian economy is accelerating, and many government departments have moved ahead in an impressive way to prepare the country for finalizing the Stabilization and Association talks with Brussels. Thanks to the improvements in Serbia's co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the European Commission resumed the talks on the SAA on 13 June 2007. The pace and conclusion of negotiations will continue to depend in particular on Serbia's progress in developing its legislative framework and administrative capacity, and full co-operation with the ICTY.

The province of *Kosovo*, referred in this paper as UNMIK/Kosovo, is definitely the main source of instability in the Balkans. After being delayed and postponed, the Vienna-based status talks ended in March 2007. The UN Envoy was not able to present a settlement package resulting from, or endorsed at, the Vienna talks. Nevertheless, he submitted a Final Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement, which advocates supervised and limited independence as the only viable option for Kosovo. A new Kosovo UNSC resolution was delayed, this time by the G8 summit (6–8 June 2007) — with the hope an agreement could be reached in this framework. But this was not the case — quite the contrary: the powers at the G8 summit in Heiligendamm agreed to delay a vote at the United Nations. While Russia rejected a third draft of a resolution on Kosovo, proposed by US and the EU, on 22 June 2007, the summit of the United States president George W. Bush and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, on 2 July 2007 in Maine, did not spend too much time discussing Kosovo. In the face of a promised Russian veto, the resolution regarding a future status was formally postponed on 21 July 2007.<sup>7</sup> Despite the fact that Kosovo Albanians are getting nervous, the Kosovo question took a summer break. New negotiations, based on direct talks, will take place in the autumn of 2007.

### 1.3. European integration process:

As already mentioned, the enlargement process is also dependent on EU's own internal reform process. After an excessively long 'pause for reflection', Angela Merkel — the German Chancellor who held the six-month rotating EU presidency during the first semester of 2007 — intensified her diplomatic efforts in order to reopen the Union's treaty reform process. After Poland stepped back from a dramatic threat to veto any agreement, the breakthrough came on a Reform Treaty aimed to replace the defunct proposed constitution. This treaty will streamline EU decision-making, improve the EU international presence with a High Representative and a permanent president, and provide the institutional framework to resume the enlargement process.<sup>8</sup>

This package should be finalized at an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to be organized in the summer of 2007; and it also includes an additional condition for candidate countries: a commitment to promote EU values. Further, there will be an obligation to notify the European Parliament and national parliaments of an application for membership. Thus, the Reform Treaty might include institutional changes increasing the entry difficulties for would-be EU members. These already exist in the form of an unprecedented monitoring regime set up for Bulgaria and Romania. Indeed, when Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU on 1 January 2007, special provisions were made to facilitate and support smooth accession, and at the same time to safeguard the proper functioning of EU policies and institutions. The European Commission monitors the application of law (the *acquis communautaire*) to

---

<sup>7</sup> See Christophe Solioz, "Kosovo: The Moment of Truth," in Hannes Swoboda and Christophe Solioz (eds.), *Conflict and Renewal: Europe Transformed. Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Petritsch* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), pp. 296-304.

<sup>8</sup> The European Council agreed on 23 June 2007 to convene an IGC before the end of July 2007 which is tasked to draw up a Reform Treaty before the end of 2007, so as to allow for sufficient time to ratify the resulting treaty before the European Parliament elections in June 2009.

ensure that these obligations are being met. Thus, the accession of both countries was accompanied by a set of specific accompanying measures, put in place to prevent or remedy remaining shortcomings that were identified in several areas. A special Cooperation and Verification Mechanism was established in the areas of judicial reform, the fight against corruption and organized crime, which set out benchmarks to provide the framework for monitoring progress in this area. The European Commission approved the first reports on progress under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism on 27 June 2007. These reports focus on progress with judicial reform, the fight against corruption and organized crime.<sup>9</sup> Meanwhile, on 21 June 2007 the European Commission finalized its planning for the financial assistance candidate and potential candidate countries will receive in 2007–2009 under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).<sup>10</sup> Thus, the institutional and financial capacities to proceed with the integration process are now finally available.

**Table 3: Transition indicators for 2006**

	large scale privatization	small scale privatization	restructuring	price liberalization	foreign trade and exchange rate regimes	competition policy	Banking reform and interest rate liberalization
Albania	3.00	4.00	2.33	4.33	4.33	2.00	2.67
B&H	2.67	3.00	2.00	4.00	3.67	1.67	2.67
Croatia	3.33	4.33	3.00	4.00	4.33	2.33	4.00
Macedonia	3.33	4.00	2.67	4.33	4.33	2.00	2.67
Montenegro	3.33	3.00	2.00	4.00	3.33	1.00	2.67
Serbia	2.67	3.67	2.33	4.00	3.33	1.67	2.67

  

	stock-exchange and other non-banking financial services	other infrastructure reform	Telecommunications	railroads	electricity	Roads	water and waste-water
Albania	1.67	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.67	2.00	1.67
B&H	1.67	2.33	2.33	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00
Croatia	3.00	3.00	3.67	2.67	3.00	3.00	3.33
Macedonia	2.33	2.33	3.00	2.00	3.00	2.33	2.33
Montenegro	1.67	2.00	3.00	1.00	2.33	2.00	2.00
Serbia	2.00	2.00	2.33	2.33	2.33	2.67	1.67

NB: progress is measured on a scale from 1 to 4; with 4 and 4+ or 4.33 indicating that the level of the developed has been achieved.

Source: *Transition Report 2006*

Despite these recent positive changes, we have to consider some limits of the current integration

<sup>9</sup> See Commission of the European Communities, *Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the council on Bulgaria's progress on accompanying measures following Accession* (Brussels: COM 2007) 377, 27 June 2007) and *Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the council on Romania's progress on accompanying measures following Accession* (Brussels: COM (2007) 378, 27 June 2007). These reports have been prepared in this post-Accession perspective and seek to assess the progress made on the commitments made at the time of Accession. The reports are not monitoring reports. They are an assessment made under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism established by the Commission decision of 13 December 2006.

<sup>10</sup> An overall indicative amount of € 3.96 billion will help Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo (under UNSC resolution 1244) enhance political and economic reform and development. It must be noticed that IPA Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Documents for 2007-2009 include under 'IPA Component II' significant means to enhance cross border co-operation.

process. 'Enlargement fatigue' has had negative consequences for the region, while the 'pull factor' and stimulus for reform of the implementation processes, though not completely vanished, is less convincing today given their currently slow progress. In spite of the fact the economies in the region are doing now much better, 'reform fatigue' characterizes the public governance and structural reforms of most of the countries — except Croatia — as illustrated by the indicators for the advance of transition published by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (see table 3). Worse, aggressive nationalism receives a new opening and affects the domestic divide in various countries. This might well affect stability and moves us into potentially dangerous and unpredictable territory. We may also observe that the 'EU soft power' — conditionality built on attraction — worked pretty well in countries whose chances of accession were tangible and where the transformation process was already under way. But when it comes to political problems — as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and UNMIK/Kosovo — the attraction of membership shows its limits. A more coercive approach based on conditionality and built on compulsion is obviously needed. This, of course, contradicts the trend toward more 'ownership'.

While local political forces — especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and UNMIK/Kosovo — are unable to agree about their own future, the limits of the technocratic and *acquis*-focused approach — successfully applied by the European Commission to the 2004 entrants, as well as to Romania and Bulgaria — are obvious. Given the politicized nature of the accession debate on Croatia and Turkey; and considering also the political and security issues presented by UNMIK/Kosovo, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina; the EU needs to rethink the European project in the region and, above all, embrace politics in order to make Southeastern Europe work.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, it should be not forgotten that the EU enlargement project in the region is also very much a peace project. But the limits of the technical nature of the accession talks represent only one problem. The importance of regional co-operation — especially if we consider the magnitude of the economic dimension — is another central issue that must be addressed.

Affecting stability in the region as a whole and at the country level, as well as economic prospects, are typical cross-border issues: foreign direct investment, trade and transport facilitation, people mobility and migration, environment protection and energy supply. These regional–trans-boundary issues must be addressed as part of a broader regional vision encompassing the geo-strategic role of these countries bridging Europe and Asia, Europe and the Middle-East. Of course, this speaks in favour of broader understanding of Southeastern Europe, which links the Danube region, Central and Eastern Europe with Western Asia and Russia. Against this background, regional initiatives as well as pan-European regional organizations should become more active in fostering the regional economic integration process in a pan-European framework. This would not interfere with, but rather complement and reinforce EU integration and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).<sup>12</sup> Among other elements of a pan-European approach with much added value is that these countries are deemed as 'European' by culture, history and geo-strategic considerations — emphasizing that Europe is more than just the enlarged EU. This broader concept of Europe must now be made a reality.

---

<sup>11</sup> See T.K. Vogel, "Why the EU Need to Embrace Politics if it Wants to Make the Balkans Works," in Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojčić-Dželilović (eds.), *Austrian Presidency of EU: Regional Approaches to the Balkans* (Vienna: Centre for the Study of Global Governance & Center for European Integration Strategies, 2006), pp. 62-70.

<sup>12</sup> The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) — an adapted strategy for a 'Wider Europe' — intends to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines on the European continent and to establish close partnership-based relations, focusing on strengthening security and stability, with non-EU member states. The ENP has an impressive and comprehensive regional coverage targeting all European states of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including the South Caucasus and all the Mediterranean states of the Barcelona process. But the ENP does not represent an enlargement policy, nor does it aim to open up the prospect of membership to the countries concerned or to provide specific accession prospects — even if it does not prejudge prospects for some countries that may at some future point apply for membership, which is strongly desired by Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia. See Commission of the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper* (Brussels: COM (2004) 373, 12 May 2004); and Commission of the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission: On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy* (Brussels: COM (2006) 726, 4 December 2006).

*Outlook*

- Each Southeast Europe country is evolving apace, with a common need to keep the EU membership perspective alive — not as a false hope, but as a realistic development prospect, both as a stimulus for reform and to promote their survival as peaceful societies.
- The EU integration process remains essentially a country-by-country approach that partly undermines regional co-operation in spite of the rhetoric on developing constructive relations among neighbour countries.
- The fostering of effective neighbourhood relations, regional co-operation — implemented in a broad pan-European perspective — should be seen not as a conditionality, but as strategic setting, within which the countries can make progress.

## 2. Perspectives on a pan-European Approach

### 2.1. The necessity of a comprehensive framework

Individual strategies and good-neighbourly relations cannot tackle all the challenges that the countries in the region face. National and bilateral solutions are not enough when it comes to economic development, climate change, migration pressure, energy policy strategies and international terrorism, etc. Only a pan-European vision, firstly, sets the bilateral issues and the regional dimension in a coherent and significant framework for an efficient development of economic, political and cultural co-operation, and, secondly, ensures a bold and new vision for Southeastern Europe, and also for Europe as a whole.

Firstly, a truly pan-European approach systematically links national and regional, local and global perspectives in a multilateral co-operation framework — moving resolutely beyond national country-based strategies and bilateral country-to-country approaches. Secondly, it encompasses political and socio-economic aspects, the security dimension and the development challenges. Thirdly, it covers the whole of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the Caucasus region, and Russia, reaching out towards Eurasia, including the Caspian region and Central Asia.

Such an approach could contribute to overcoming the new divisions and contradictions induced by the latest round of the EU enlargement.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, today more than in the past, Southeastern Europe and the Black Sea region are heterogeneous areas encompassing EU members, would-be-members and countries explicitly barred from an EU accession perspective — such as Ukraine, Russia and the Caucasian states. The increased complexity of bilateral and regional relations is illustrated by the Romanian and Bulgarian case: as new EU members, they must strengthen their borders with their eastern neighbours, but this contradicts and undermines the promotion of regional co-operation. But there is more — co-operation within the region and co-operation between the region and the EU on the one hand, and the co-existence of numerous co-operation programmes — such as the Pre-accession process, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the strategic partnership with Russia and bilateral agreements and action plans — on the other hand, considerably augment the structural complexity and tension that must be strategically addressed.

An additional divide must also be taken into account — the division between an economically and political stable Europe and a Europe characterized by economic and political instability. Thus, there is

---

<sup>13</sup> On 1 May 2004, the EU welcomed 10 more member states: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. This was the fifth time that the EU accepted new members, bringing the total from 15 to 25 member states. On 1 January 2007, this latest round of enlargement came to its conclusion with the accession of two more countries, Bulgaria and Romania.

a division between the economically developed Europe — ‘old Europe’, with some Central European countries — and an underdeveloped Europe — most Southeast European countries, Russia, the Caspian basin and Central Asia. Looked at the other way round, the ‘new Europe’s’ experience in the fields of innovation and economic restructuring may provide a starting point for overcoming the conventional policies of the ‘old Europe’, where strong obstacles hamper privatization and liberalization. Such an approach suggests, firstly, that new ideas may come out of the ‘other Europe’ — notably in the field of social reforms — and, secondly, that the transformation process is not over, and not only in Southeastern Europe.

In practical terms, these divisions are reflected, for example, in the more difficult conditions for crossing the borders of the new EU members, and consequent problems for business. This fragmentation clearly undermines the potential for broad regional and pan-European co-operation, particularly in the economic realm. This affects Southeastern Europe, but also the Black Sea region<sup>14</sup> — an expanding market with an economic potential that remains largely untapped. We may also mention other typical regional issues: energy resources and energy security measures, and environmental protection. Countries from the region are too small to adopt individual strategies in the transport sector: the upgrading of transport infrastructures, trade development and facilitation. Consequently, the reduction of administrative barriers to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital obviously require a multilateral, inclusive framework. Of course, the above-mentioned lines of division benefit the forces opposed to the stabilization of the region, and, therefore, ought to be countered by effective and appropriate policy — notably through conflict-resolution and confidence-building mechanisms addressing the political tensions and frozen conflicts between states, and shared measures against illegal migration, trafficking and organised crime. In our view, only a pan-European framework can address and overcome these divisions.

A reinvigorated pan-European approach would, firstly, foster these countries’ European identity; secondly, contribute to the development of a common EU-U.S.-Russia approach to the open questions, and, thirdly, promote a pan-European economic integration and co-operation process beyond too narrowly conceived regional frameworks. In a renewed pan-European and transatlantic dynamic, Eastern and Southeastern European countries have a major role to play — being more open to co-operation with the U.S., Russia and non-EU Eastern European countries in the Black Sea region and the Caucasus. The three above-mentioned dimensions exactly correspond to pan-European institutions’ priorities. Consequently, complementing the EU integration process, pan-European organisations — by definition inclusive<sup>15</sup> — should give life to a renewed pan-European dynamic.

## 2.2. Southeastern Europe’s key challenge:

There are obviously needs specific to Southeast European countries. While several regional initiatives contribute to shape regional co-operation (see section 3) and the new multilateral Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)<sup>16</sup> addresses the issue of regional trade, hard security issues must still be tackled: the status of UNMIK/Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s internal integration. It is time

---

<sup>14</sup> The Black Sea region includes Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova in the west, Ukraine and Russia in the north, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the east and Turkey in the south. Though Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Greece are not littoral states, history, proximity and close ties make them natural regional actors. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) is a relevant organisation with a wide membership including Russia and Turkey as founding member states.

<sup>15</sup> Compared to the exclusive ones like the EU and NATO.

<sup>16</sup> As of 1<sup>st</sup> May 2007, eight parties were the prospective members of the new CEFTA: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and UNMIK/Kosovo under UN administration, which negotiated the revision of the old CEFTA agreement together with Bulgaria and Romania. The new CEFTA (CEFTA 2006) officially entered into force on 26 July 2007 for five parties, which had ratified the agreement: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and UNMIK/Kosovo. These are not countries belonging to Central Europe but to SEE. The original CEFTA agreement was signed by the Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary and Czech and Slovak republics) in December 1992 and entered into force in July 1994; participating countries wanted to enhance co-operation and facilitate their European integration. Meanwhile, all former participating countries have become EU members, so in fact CEFTA has served as a preparation for full EU membership. It has to be noted that by time of writing the new CEFTA agreement is not yet ratified by Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

to acknowledge that the conflicts in the region have common historical roots, which warrants their being examined comprehensively, taking account of their interconnectedness and mutual influences. It is also high time that the belated state-building process is addressed, given that it has considerably slowed the integration process, producing the irony that “in the Balkans as a whole, today (...) there are more democracies than sovereign states” — as Ivan Krastev put it.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, we may consider most of these countries as weak states — weak in terms of legitimacy, authority and institutionalization, and especially in terms of the rule of law.

State-building demands a process of change, a politics of reform based on developments in society and markets. If truth be told, “when it comes to the use of resources by the state, the stress is on the targets and efficiency and not so much on their level. Indeed, weak states, being captured states too, often allocate and distribute a lot of resources, which does not contribute to their capacity to lead in the reform and development effort”.<sup>18</sup> Thus, if the states have a role to play as central policy-making institutions, reforms should be the consequence of developments in society and the markets. Of course, a well-organized state and consolidated democracy alone cannot secure reforms; other factors beyond the above-mentioned one also contribute to a favourable environment, regional stability and co-operation matters. Therefore, for the region and for the sake of Europe as a whole, careful, long-term strategic thinking is called for here.

But the nation-building issue should also be addressed — the time has come to close still-open wounds, to secure long-lasting stability, to consolidate democracy, and to ensure significant economic growth and prosperity. In order to move beyond the *cliché* that “the international community has failed to offer a convincing perspective to the societies in the region”<sup>19</sup> and to foster an agreement based on permanent solutions providing a solid political future to Southeast European countries, an international conference on the future of the region — an initiative suggested by Milan Kučan — should be organized during 2008.<sup>20</sup> This conference must be pan-European, in order to engage both the U.S. and Russia as partners in this effort.

#### *Outlook*

- Europe experiences new divides: firstly, there are differences inside the EU between ‘old Europe’ and ‘new Europe,’ and secondly, Southeastern Europe is a highly heterogeneous region encompassing EU member states, candidate countries and non-candidates.
- Taking into account a newly assertive Russia, and the necessity to enhance co-operation in a new environment, pan-European organizations have an obvious role to play in restoring confidence and building new bridges.
- The Eastern and Southeast European countries have to play a leading role in promoting a broad dialogue at the pan-Euro-Atlantic level.

---

<sup>17</sup> Ivan Krastev, “The Balkans: Democracy Without Choices,” *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (2002) 3, p. 39.

<sup>18</sup> Ivo Bićanić and Vladimir Gligorov, Ivan Krastev, *State, Public Goods and Reform* (Vienna: wiiw, 2003), p. 31.

<sup>19</sup> International Commission on the Balkans, *The Balkans in Europe's Future* (Sofia, 2005), p. 7.

<sup>20</sup> See Milan Kučan, “A New View for the Balkans,” in Hannes Swoboda and Christophe Solioz (eds.), *Conflict and Renewal: Europe Transformed. Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Petritsch* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), pp. 217-23.

### 3. The Fate of regional initiatives in SEE

Regional initiatives in Southeastern Europe are often related to post-war situations. We might briefly recall the leading role of Yugoslavia in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),<sup>21</sup> an international movement that has since lost most of its credibility. The end of the Cold War brought the 1988 Summit of Foreign Ministers of South Eastern Europe (SFMSEE), a regional initiative renamed in 1996 the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and, in 1989, the Central European Initiative (CEI) — an initiative establishing a platform for mutual political, economic, scientific and cultural co-operation with a secretariat in Trieste<sup>22</sup> — and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), a multilateral political and economic initiative based since 1994 in Istanbul.<sup>23</sup> In 1995, after the Bosnian war, the European Council initiated the Royaumont Process to promote stability and good neighborliness in Southeastern Europe, while the U.S. initiated the South East European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) in December 1996, which encourages co-operation among the countries of the region in order to facilitate Southeast Europe EU integration.<sup>24</sup> The Kosovo crisis and NATO intervention in 1999 led to the establishment on 10 June 1999 of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. The Stability Pact's ambition was to replace the previous reactive crisis-intervention policy in the region with a comprehensive, long-term conflict-prevention strategy, and to strengthen Southeast Europe countries "in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region".<sup>25</sup>

The above list of initiatives, far from being complete, represents the most prominent forums. There are obvious common features of these regional initiatives: the lists of objectives and membership generally overlap,<sup>26</sup> their respective activities consist mostly in meetings, the budgets are small and cover infrastructure costs, there are a limited number of implemented projects, and the overall output is modest. Exceptions are SECI, which focused on a set of priorities — notably on cross-border projects in the areas of infrastructure development, trade and transport issues, security, energy, environment, and private sector development — and the Stability Pact. The latter, often seen as just an additional forum for the exchange of views, managed to successfully coordinate programs and projects targeting a broad spectrum of initiatives focusing on energy and regional infrastructures, trade and investments, cross-border co-operation, parliamentary co-operation, and fighting corruption and organized crime. It is noteworthy that SEECP is the only original form of co-operation among the countries in the region launched on their own initiative.<sup>27</sup> Thus, except SEECP, the very notion of regional co-operation was part of post-conflict stabilization efforts of the international community, and not a genuinely endogenous process.

---

<sup>21</sup> The concept 'Non-Alignment' was coined by Indian PM Nehru in 1954. The first summit was held in Belgrade in 1961. The world's 'non-aligned' nations declared their desire not to become involved in the East-West ideological confrontation of the Cold War. The movement lost credibility in the late 1960s when it was seen by critics to have become dominated by states allied to the Soviet Union. The movement fractured from its own internal contradictions when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Post-Yugoslav Republics have expressed little interest in the NAM since the country's break-up. Malta and Cyprus ceased to be members of the NAM when they joined the EU. The most recent summit of the Non-Aligned Movement took place in Havana in 2006. Information are available at <http://www.cubanoal.cu/ingles/index.html>.

<sup>22</sup> The origin of the CEI lies in the agreement signed in Budapest on 11 November 1989 by Italy, Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia, establishing a platform for co-operation called Quadrilateral Cooperation. In 1990 with the admission of Czechoslovakia, it became the Pentagonal Initiative, and in 1991, following the admission of Poland, it was renamed the Hexagonal Initiative. Following the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, the Vienna Summit in 1992 admitted the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia, and approved the renaming of the grouping as Central European Initiative. Macedonia was admitted in 1993 at the Budapest Summit. In 1993 the Secretariat started operating at the EBRD in London. Information are available at <http://www.ceinet.org>.

<sup>23</sup> BSEC member countries are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine; 7 EU countries, Croatia, Belarus, Egypt, Israel, Tunisia and U.S. are observers. Information are available at <http://www.bsec-organization.org>.

<sup>24</sup> SECI was launched as an idea in Vienna in 1995; the aim is to focus, instead on political co-operation, on effective operational operation. The SECI Participating States include: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and, as of December 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Information are available at <http://www.secinet.org>.

<sup>25</sup> SCSP constituent document, Cologne 10 June 1999; available at <http://www.stabilitypact.org/constituent/990610-cologne.asp>.

<sup>26</sup> A typical list includes: strengthening of security and political co-operation, intensification of economic relations and co-operation in human resources, democracy, justice, and combating organized crime; and, last but not least, facilitate the approach of European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

<sup>27</sup> SEECP Participating States are: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, FYROM, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and Turkey, founding countries; Bosnia and Herzegovina (February 2001); Croatia (2004); Republic of Moldova applied for observer status.

Against this background, the ongoing process transforming the Stability Pact into the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC) indicates a major evolution towards more regional ownership.<sup>28</sup> Until recently, the Southeast European countries resisted most of the regional initiatives, because they were seen as being too close to the Yugoslav model. Even if it was always obvious that these countries are inextricably bound to Eastern European countries as well by historical, cultural, political, social and economic ties, regional co-operation was often perceived and conducted only because it was a requirement from outside — an EU conditionality. Thus, 'regional co-operation' rhetoric was often just "another sign of dependency — because it [was] not owned or promoted primarily by the region itself".<sup>29</sup>

But now the time is ripe for this major shift: Southeastern Europe seems much more open today to facing problems that can only be addressed on a regional basis. This includes attracting foreign investment, facing the energy supply issue and fighting organized crime. Business people routinely cross borders and realize strategic partnerships; cultural productions from varied parts of the region find audiences throughout the region; and artists and producers co-operate as if the wall of the recent past was never there. This applies in a particular way to the former Yugoslavia — the anti-Yugoslav fixation appears to be more and more outdated. As observed by Tihomir Loza, at work here are forces linked to cultural proximity and affinity: "Yugoslavia was more than a state. Once it ceased to exist and as the causes of conflict among its constituent parts fade, things that the people of the region want to share irrespective of political arrangements among them become prominent".<sup>30</sup> Loza suggests this might be facilitated "because none of the ways in which Yugoslavia is really being recreated promises (...) that the region will again be shaped into a single country".<sup>31</sup>

Politicians are aware of this new mood. On 24 June 2007, Serbian President Boris Tadić apologized to Croats for war-related hardships: Croatian President Stjepan Mesić said it was especially significant, as the former Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic had caused the greatest losses to all [in the former Yugoslavia], including among Serbs. Zoran Milanović, leader of the main opposition Social Democratic Party, also praised Tadić's statement as evidence of new leadership in Serbia. As highlighted by Ivo Sanader, the Prime Minister of Croatia: "it has become evident that the time is ripe to adjust some features of this co-operation network and architecture, to refocus activities in order to enhance the regional ownership dimension, to increase efficiency in order to achieve Euro-Atlantic strategic goals. Hence the subtitle of this conference — From the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe to the Regional Co-operation Council: Enhancing the Voice of the Region".<sup>32</sup>

The previous regional initiatives need careful recalibration and innovative thinking. Firstly, regional and pan-European organizations must enhance coordination among themselves, especially when it comes to initiatives implemented in the region: pragmatism and (cost) efficiency are the keywords. To put it the other way round, to enhance its capacities, the RCC might consider focusing on achievable goals and professional expertise, relying on and involving such existing pan-European institutions as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UNECE. Secondly, Southeast Europe countries must encompass the process of wider regional co-operation, including with non-EU countries in Eastern Europe, notably Russia, and countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Mediterranean basin. Such a broad regional network would be of interest at the political, economic and cultural levels. This would provide pan-European organizations with the necessary legitimacy to be considered as key

---

<sup>28</sup> The Stability Pact will be phased out in February 2008 and be replaced by the RCC, the headquarter of which will be based in Sarajevo. The first Secretary-General of the new organization will be the Croat diplomat Hido Bišćević. All countries of the region, regardless of their status vis-à-vis the EU or NATO, will be members of the RCC and its Board: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia (FYROM), Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Turkey and UNMIK/Kosovo.

<sup>29</sup> Gregor W. Kössler, "Regional Cooperation in South East Europe," in Hannes Swoboda and Christophe Solioz (eds.), *Conflict and Renewal: Europe Transformed. Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Petritsch* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), p. 225.

<sup>30</sup> Tihomir Loza, "Yugoslavia: Rising from the Ashes," *Transitions Online*, (26 June 2007); available at <http://www.tol.cz>.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>32</sup> Ivo Sanader, "Croatia's European Role and Responsibility in South East Europe as SEECF Chairmanship," opening address to the International Conference: *Regional Cooperation Challenges 2007/2008. From the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe to the Regional Cooperation Council: Enhancing the Voice of the Region*, Zagreb, 8 September 2006.

actors.

#### *Outlook*

Existing initiatives should be streamlined by exploring their complementarity and improving their co-ordination. There is an obvious need for reinforcing existing solutions (conventions, standards and tools) to address problems in trade and transport facilitation, environmental protection, energy supply, security and efficiency, etc. rather than developing duplicating initiatives, which will survive only until these regional initiatives are financed.

Evaluation and impact assessment are missing at the regional level. Pan-European organizations should examine — through common country assessment and a regional review — how Southeast European countries adopt and implement the various pan-European organizations' tools in the fields of trade, environment, energy and statistics.

Pan-European organizations should develop a regional co-operation indicator, focusing on the economic dimension — not as a trendy intellectual gadget, but as a reliable tool assessing progress in this matter. This would definitively provide a common and reliable indicator that could be useful in assessing progress and elaborating new strategies.

## Conclusion

The EU integration process represents a particularly strong source of outside interference for Southeast European countries. Different to what happened in the case of the integration of Central European countries, the EU is directly involved in the institutional development and decision-making processes of the next group of potential EU member countries. In the best case, instead of ownership, we may speak of an ownership-friendly 'positive conditionality' — to use a term coined by Othon Anastakis and Dimitar Bechev.<sup>33</sup> Against this background, the establishment of the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC) is sending out a strong signal: Southeast European countries are shifting from a passive policy-tracking to a pro-active policy-making approach. This locally owned regional co-operation process should be supported and completed by a broader pan-European approach that would focus on practical results and prioritize well-defined sectoral activities enhancing regional economic development.

From this viewpoint, Southeast European countries should not consider pan-European organizations as a 'waiting room', but as partners able, firstly, to provide technical assistance in the application of norms and standards that also correspond to the *acquis communautaire*; secondly, to help them view their economic problems and policies in a pan-European rather than a purely national framework; and, thirdly, to up-grade their regional co-operation to a truly pan-European level. In a broader sense, already available pan-European instruments may contribute to overcoming newly established divisions — between EU member, would-be-member and non-member — and foster consensus at the pan-European level.

Considering the importance of the pan-European dimension, both at the economic and geo-strategic levels, pan-European organizations should reinvigorate their approach and work out a road map — focusing on key issues of regional co-operation — for pan-European policies that could be used as a long-term strategic framework.

---

<sup>33</sup> Othon Anastasakis and Dimitar Bechev, *EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the Process* (Oxford: St Antony's College, European Studies Centre, April 2003), p. 3.

## Bibliography

- Anastasakis Othon and Dimitar Bechev, *EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the Process* (Oxford: St Antony's College, European Studies Centre, April 2003).
- Berthelot, Yves and Paul Rayment, *Looking back and Peering Forward. A Short History of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1947-2007* (New York – Geneva: UNECE, 2007), 157 pp.
- Bićanić, Ivo and Vladimir Gligorov and Ivan Krastev, *State, Public Goods and Reform* (Vienna: wiiw, 2003),
- Carothers, Thomas, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 409 pp.
- , *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 300 pp.
- , “How Democracies Emerge,” *Journal of Democracy*, 18 (2007) 1, pp. 12-27.
- Carothers, Thomas (ed.), *Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 363 pp.
- Carothers, Thomas & Marina Ottaway (eds.), *Uncharted Journey. Promoting Democracy in the Middle East* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 302 pp.
- Chandler, David, *From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 268 pp.
- , *Empire in Denial. The Politics of State-building* (London: Pluto Press, 2006), 221 pp.
- Chestermann, Simon, *Kosovo in Limbo: State-Building and 'Substantial Autonomy'* (New York: International Peace Academy, August 2001), 15 pp.
- Chestermann, Simon and Michael Ignatieff & Ramesh Thakur (eds.), *Making States Work. State Failure and the Crisis of Governance* (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2005), 400 pp.
- Dvornik, Srđan and Christophe Solioz (eds.), *Next Steps in Croatia's Transition Process* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 157 pp.
- Džihic, Vedran, Nadjivan, Silvia, Paić, Hrvoje & Stachowitsch, Saskia, *Europa – verflucht begehrt. Europavorstellungen in Bosnien-Herzegowina, Kroatien und Serbien* (Vienna: Braumüller, 2006), 301 pp.
- “Europe centrale et orientale 2005-2006,” *Le courrier des pays de l'Est*, (July-August 2006), 1056.
- “Europe centrale et orientale 2006-2007,” *Le courrier des pays de l'Est*, (July-August 2007), 1062.
- European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), *Transition Report 2003: Integration and Regional Cooperation* (London: EBRD, 2003), 234 pp.
- , *Transition Report 2004: Infrastructure* (London: EBRD, 2004), 204 pp.
- , *Transition Report 2005: Business in Transition* (London: EBRD, 2005), 208 pp.
- , *Transition Report 2006: Finance in Transition* (London: EBRD, 2006), 204 pp.
- , *Transition Report Update 2007* (London: EBRD, 2007), 71 pp.
- European Commission, *2006 Pre-accession Economic Programmes of Candidate Countries* (Brussels: European Economy occasional papers, no. 31, June 2007), 58 pp.
- Freedom House, *Nations in Transit 2006: Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 710 pp.
- , *Nations in Transit 2007: Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007).
- Gagnon Jr., V.P., *The Myth of Ethnic War. Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2004), 217 pp.
- Glamocak, Marina, *La Transition guerrière Yougoslave* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002), 287 pp.
- Gligorov, Vladimir, *Task Force on Economic Strategy for South Eastern Europe* (New York: East-West Institute, advanced copy, April 2000), 46 pp.
- , *Aiding Balkans* (Vienna: wiiw, January 2006), 18 pp.
- , *Balkan Endgame and Economic Transformation* (Vienna: wiiw, December 2006), 17 pp.
- , *Transition, Integration, and Development in Southeast Europe* (Vienna: wiiw, January 2007), 43 pp.
- Gligorov, Vladimir and Mary Kaldor, Loukas Tsoukalis, *Balkan Reconstruction and European Integration* (Vienna: Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW), October 1991), 56 pp.
- Gligorov, Vladimir and Sándor Richter *et al.*, *High Growth Continues, with Risks of Overheating on the Horizon* (Vienna: wiiw, Series: Research Reports, no. 341, July 2007), 139 pp.
- Huntington, Samuel P., *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 366 pp.
- International Commission on the Balkans, *The Balkans in Europe's Future* (Sofia: Centre for Liberal Strategies, 2005), 64 pp.

- Kostovicova, Denisa and Vesna Bojičić-Dželilović (eds.), *Austrian Presidency of the EU: Regional Approaches to the Balkans* (Vienna: Centre for the Study of Global Governance & Center for European Integration Strategies in cooperation with the Renner Institute, 2006), 183 pp.
- Krastev, Ivan (ed.), *Human Security in South-East Europe* (UNDP, August 1999), 48 pp.
- Krastev, Ivan, "The Balkans: Democracy Without Choices," *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (2002) 3, pp. 39-53
- , "Weak states as a security threat," *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen*, 44 (2004) 4, pp. 102-16.
- Loza, Tihomir, "Yugoslavia: Rising from the Ashes," *Transitions Online*, (26 June 2007).
- Ott, Katarina (ed.), *Croatian Accession to the European Union: Economics and Legal Challenges*, Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2001, 303 pp.
- (ed.), *Croatian Accession to the European Union: Institutional Challenges*, Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2002, 339 pp.
- (ed.), *Croatian Accession to the European Union: Facing the Challenges of Negotiations*, Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2003, 297 pp.
- (ed.) *Croatian Accession to the European Union: The Challenges of Participation*, Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance & FES, 2006, 404 pp.
- Ottaway, Marina & Carothers, Thomas (eds.), *Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, 340 pp.
- Roth, Klaus (ed.), *Soziale Netzwerke und soziales Vertrauen in den Transformationsländern* (Vienna: LIT, 2007), 332 pp.
- Sanader, Ivo, "Croatia's European Role and Responsibility in South East Europe as SEECP Chairmanship," opening address to the International Conference: *Regional Cooperation Challenges 2007/2008. From the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe to the Regional Cooperation Council: Enhancing the Voice of the Region* (Zagreb, 8 September 2006).
- Schultz, Siegfried and Ulrich Brasche, "Absorptionskapazität der Europäischen Union – eine Orientierungshilfe," *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen*, 47(2007) 3, pp. 6-19.
- Solioz, Christophe, *L'après-guerre dans les Balkans* (Paris: Karthala, 2003), 159 pp.
- , *Turning Points in Post-War Bosnia: Ownership Process and EU Integration* (Baden-Baden: Nomos (Democracy, Security, Peace vol. 179), 2007 [2005]), 171 pp.
- Solioz, Christophe and Svebor Dizdarević (eds.), *Ownership Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Sarajevo, 2001), 120 pp.
- Solioz, Christophe and Tobias K. Vogel, *Dayton and Beyond: Perspectives on the Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Baden-Baden: Nomos (Democracy, Security, Peace vol. 171), 2004), 224 pp.
- Swoboda, Hannes and Christophe Solioz (eds.), *Conflict and Renewal: Europe Transformed. Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Petritsch* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 407 pp.
- United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey for Europe 2000* (UNECE: Geneva, 2000 no 1), 240 pp.
- , *Economic Survey for Europe 2001* (UNECE: Geneva, 2001, no 1), 269 pp.
- , *Economic Survey for Europe 2002* (UNECE: Geneva, 2002, no 1), 244 pp.
- , *Economic Survey for Europe 2003* (UNECE: Geneva, 2002, no 1), 239 pp.
- , *Economic Survey for Europe 2003* (UNECE: Geneva, 2002, no 2), 127 pp.
- , *Economic Survey for Europe 2004* (UNECE: Geneva, 2003, no 1), 205 pp.
- , *Economic Survey for Europe 2004* (UNECE: Geneva, 2004, no 2), 95 pp.
- , *Economic Survey for Europe 2005* (UNECE: Geneva, 2005, no 1), 143 pp.
- Woodward, Susan L., *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), ix-536 pp.
- , *Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945-1990* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 443 pp.
- , "Construire l'Etat: légitimité internationale contre légitimité nationale?" *Critique internationales*, (2005) 28, pp. 139-152.
- World Bank, *From Red to Grey. The 'Third Transition of Aging Populations in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union* (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2007), 271 pp.

## Acronyms

BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement
CEI	Central European Initiative
CEIS	Center for European Integration Strategies
CoE	Council of Europe
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTF	Consultative Task Force
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace
ICG	Intergovernmental Conference
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NTB	non-tariff barriers to trade
RCC	Regional Co-operation Council
SAA	Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SAP	Stabilisation and Association Process
SECI	South East European Cooperation Initiative
SEE	Southeast Europe
SEEC	South-East European Cooperation Process
SFMSEE	Summit of Foreign Ministers of South Eastern Europe
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

**Christophe Solioz**

Born in Bremen as a Swiss citizen. Studied philosophy, psychology, pedagogy and Italian and German literature at the Universities of Zurich and Geneva. Visiting professor of sociology, social therapist and languages teacher.

Since 1992, coordinator of different projects, firstly in the sector of civil society development, and secondly in the field of transition and democratization processes in different post-Yugoslav republics. Former chair of the Swiss Helsinki Citizens' Assembly (until 1997); the *Forum for Democratic Alternatives* [isn], Sarajevo/Geneva/Brussels and the *Association Bosnia and Herzegovina 2005* (until 2005); currently executive director of the *Center for European Integration Strategies* (CEIS). Since 2000, leading "The Next Step" research project on ownership-enhancing strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia.

Has had articles published in *Le Temps*, *Libération*, *Le Courrier des Pays de l'Est* and *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen*. Edited books with Svebor Dizdarević, published by Nomos: *Ownership Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (2003); with T. K. Vogel, *Dayton and Beyond* (2004), with Hannes Swoboda, *Conflict and Renewal: Europe Transformed* (2007); and with Srđan Dvornik, *Croatia's Transition Process* (2007). Author of *L'après-guerre dans les Balkans* (Paris: Karthala, 2003) and *Turning Points in Post-War Bosnia* (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2005; second edition 2007).

Contact:           csolioz@mac.com  
                      christophe.solioz@ceis-eu.org

Homepage:        <http://www.christophesolioz.ch>  
                      <http://www.ceis-eu.org>